Director\u27s Responsibilities and Shareholders\u27 Interests in the Aftermath of Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc. by Bull, Robert E.
Chicago-Kent Law Review 
Volume 65 




Director's Responsibilities and Shareholders' Interests in the 
Aftermath of Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc. 
Robert E. Bull 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Robert E. Bull, Director's Responsibilities and Shareholders' Interests in the Aftermath of Paramount 
Communications v. Time, Inc., 65 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 885 (1989). 
Available at: https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/cklawreview/vol65/iss3/12 
This Notes is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Chicago-Kent Law Review by an authorized editor of Scholarly Commons @ IIT 
Chicago-Kent College of Law. For more information, please contact jwenger@kentlaw.iit.edu, 
ebarney@kentlaw.iit.edu. 
DIRECTORS' RESPONSIBILITIES AND SHAREHOLDERS'
INTERESTS IN THE AFTERMATH OF PARAMOUNT
COMMUNICATIONS V TIME, INC.
ROBERT E. BULL*
INTRODUCTION
One reason for the formation of corporations was the desire of busi-
nessmen to establish a fund of property distinct from the property of any
of the members' or their debts, and from the vagaries of descent and
distribution when the members died.' A further purpose in incorporat-
ing was the maintenance of the members' individual property separate
from that of the corporation and, presumptively, free from claims of the
corporation's creditors. 2 The structure of corporate control can be
viewed as pyramidal in nature, with the shareholders forming the pyra-
mid's broad base 3 and exercising their control, for the most part, by se-
lecting the individuals who serve on the board of directors. 4 Although
shareholders do not take part in the daily running of the corporation, as
owners they have ultimate control over its policies 5 However, the ad-
vent of the business judgment rule, which protects directors' informed
business decisions from court scrutiny, has led to the erosion of share-
holder control. This problem is particularly troublesome in the area of
mergers and acquisitions, where directors' desires may conflict with
shareholders' interests.
Between 1895 and 1904, a wave of mergers occurred and resulted in
a number of near monopolies. 6 Mergers from the second wave, from
1920 to 1929, resulted in many oligopolies (i.e., markets with few sell-
* The author would like to thank Professor Philip N. Hablutzel for his patient assistance and
guidance and Jeffrey R. Platt for his thoughtful suggestions and encouragement in the development
of this Note.
1. A. CONRAD, R. KNAUSS & S. SIGEL, ENTERPRISE ORGANIZATION 40 (4th ed. 1987).
2. Id.
3. R. HOWELL, J. ALLISON & R. PRENTICE, BUSINESS LAW-TEXT AND CASES 834 (4th ed.
1988). See also Booth, Is There Any Valid Reason Why Target Managers Oppose Tender Offers?, 14
SEC. REG. L.J. 43, 48-49 (1986) ("A corporation is like a contract between shareholders and man-
agement. The shareholders agree to invest, and management agrees to do its best to generate a
return on that investment.").
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Comment, Business Judgment Rule: A Benchmark for Evaluating Defensive Tactics in the
Storm of Hostile Takeovers, 31 VILL. L. REv. 1439, 1439 n.1 (1986).
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ers).7 Following World War II, a third wave of mergers involved corpo-
rations in different industries, or conglomerates.8 The next period of
intense mergers occurred from 1966 to 1970 and once more involved
conglomerate mergers. 9 Recently, merger activity has again intensified,
resulting in 16,285 mergers involving $510.9 billion in assets.10
Various reasons account for this increased merger activity. "First,
the potential acquiror may believe that it can increase the profits of the
target by replacing the target's management."'I Second, one corporation
may seek to acquire another corporation for an "economies of scale" rea-
son-namely the reduction in production and marketing costs associated
with a larger scale of operation. 12 "Third, management of an acquiring
corporation may take over a target corporation in order to diversify, and
thus, maintain corporate stability."1 3 "Fourth, managers may seek to
expand the size of their corporation because increased income and pres-
tige are customarily associated with large conglomerates." 1 4 However,
empirical data illustrates that the acquiring corporation often loses
money after its merger is successful.' 5 Finally, a corporation may want
to assure uninterrupted access to raw materials, market outlets, new
technology, or research capacity.
Balanced against the directors' desire to increase company prestige
and size is their duty to make decisions that are in the shareholders' best
interests. The directors occupy a fiduciary relationship to the corpora-
tion and must exercise the care of an ordinary prudent and diligent per-
son in a like position and under similar circumstances.' 6 This duty is
codified in many states. For example, in California, a director must per-
form duties, "in good faith, in a manner such director beieves to be in
the best interest of the corporation, and with such care, including reason-
able inquiry, as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use





11. Comment, Business Judgment Rule: A Benchmark for Evaluating Defensive Tactics in the




15. See Asquith, Merger Bids; Uncertainty, and Stockholder Returns, 11 J. FIN. ECON. 51, 81
table 9 (1983) (value of successful and unsuccessful bidder's stock often decreased during 240 days
after outcome of merger contest determined).
16. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 36, 432 A.2d 814, 824 (1981) (also known as the
duty of care).
17. CAL. CORP. CODE § 309(a) (West 1989).
[Vol. 65:885
DIRECTORS' RESPONSIBILITIES
When a company attempts to thwart an unsolicited takeover, the
courts apply the business judgment rule in deciding whether directors
have fulfilled their duty of care in responding to a takeover attempt.18
Under the business judgment rule, a court will defer to any board of
directors' decision as long as the directors can show that their decision
has a rational basis. Therefore, the business judgment rule will protect
directors who act in good faith from personal liability for mere errors of
judgment or want of prudence, short of clear and gross negligence.' 9
Although the directors must make an "informed" decision to fall under
the business judgment rule's protection, the directors may still violate
their duty of care by not giving appropriate attention to an important
corporate matter (e.g., a hostile takeover attempt) and not seeking expert
advice when it is clearly needed.20 Another problem arises when, as a
result of a merger, stock values go down. In this case, shareholders may
lose present value of their stock while their directors hide behind the
protection of the business judgment rule, even though they'have not fur-
thered the shareholders' best interests.
The problems associated with increased corporate merger and take-
over activity have been the subject of much debate. 2' The deluge of case
law22 and scholarly23 concern has focused on the directors' responsibili-
18. R. HOWELL, J. ALLISON & R. PRENTICE, supra note 3, at 895.
19. Shlensky v. Wrigley, 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1st Dist. 1968). See also Johnson
& Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG.
L.J. 339, 360 (1989) ("The purpose and effect of the business judgment rule is to safeguard board
decisions on corporate enterprise matters from judicial second-guessing and to spare directors from
personal liability").
20. R. HOWELL, J. ALLISON & R. PRENTICE, supra note 3, at 903.
21. See generally Block & Miller, The Responsibilities and Obligations of Corporate Directors in
Takeover Contests, 11 SEC. REG. L.J. 44 (1983); Easterbrook & Fischel, The Proper Role of a Tar-
get's Management in Responding to a Tender Offer, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1161 (1981) [hereinafter
Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role]; Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, Defensive Tactics, and
Shareholders' Welfare, 36 Bus. LAW. 1733 (1981) (hereinafter Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover
Bids]; Freund, Mergers and Acquisitions" The Quintessence of Change, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 495
(1988); Gilson & Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is There Sub-
stance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247 (1989); Lipton & Brownstein, Takeover Re-
sponses and Directors' Responsibilities - An Update, 40 Bus. LAW. 1403 (1985); Reder, The
Obligation of a Director of a Delaware Corporation to Act as an Auctioneer, 44 Bus. LAW. 275 (1989).
22. See, e.g., Mills Acquisition Co. v. Macmillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989) (directors
duties); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986) (directors
must maximize the company's value at a sale for the stockholders' benefits) (Although there were
two Revlon decisions, I and II, for purposes of this note, I will refer to Revlon 11 only and cite to it as
Revlon); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985) (directors can authorize a
self-tender, to the exclusion of a hostile shareholder, if the self-tender is in the shareholders' best
interests); Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227 (Del. Ch. 1988) (directors' choice to
restructure the corporation to thwart off a takeover attempt); City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc.,
551 A.2d 787 (Del. Ch. 1988) (directors may have to let shareholders choose between takeover offer
and corporate restructuring).
23. See supra note 21 and accompanying text.
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ties and duties during a takeover attempt and the concomitant share-
holder rights. However, the scales are tipped toward the directors'
decisions, with only grossly negligent decisions falling outside the pro-
tected realm.
24
While the law of mergers and acquisitions is constantly in a state of
flux, 25 courts seem content to give directors carte blanche in determining
the viability of the corporation. Several times after Delaware courts
26
took a small step toward protecting shareholders' interests, it eliminated
those advances with larger steps backwards.
27
This Note will discuss the courts' expanded protection of directors'
decisions under the loose requirements of the business judgment rule.
Directors' decisions are easily rationalized to pass muster under the busi-
ness judgment rule. First, new defensive mechanisms constantly add to
the directors' arsenal. 28 Second, directors can reject takeovers for finan-
24. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873 (Del. 1985) (directors' decisions that are
grossly negligent are not afforded the protection of the business judgment rule). See also Joseph E.
Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (directors cannot sell all of a
corporation's assets in a "scorched earth policy" to thwart off a takeover attempt, and hide behind
the protection of the business judgment rule); Post Smith v. Van Gorkom: Director Liability Legisla-
tion with a Proactive Perspective, 36 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 559 (1988) [hereinafter Post Smith]. The
author states that the Van Gorkom decision strips directors of the protective cloak of the business
judgment rule when they act with gross negligence. Id. at 559.
25. Freund, supra note 21, at 500.
26. While this Note is not written exclusively for application to Delaware law, Delaware's sta-
tus as a corporation haven has resulted in a voluminous amount of precedent in the area of mergers
and acquisitions, and most of the seminal cases concerning directors' duties and responsibilities dur-
ing hostile takeovers have come from its courts. See, e.g., Post Smith, supra note 24. The Delaware
Supreme Court's inherent power in corporate America is unmatched, and its influence transcends to
all industries and companies of every size. Id. at 567. The Delaware courts' speed and expertise in
resolving corporate issues has made Delaware the number one state for business incorporation. Id.
at 571. See also Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW.
1437, 1454 (1985) (Delaware offers corporations a solid body of precedents, is receptive to value-
increasing transactions, and realizes that allowing firms flexibility in structuring their affairs benefits
investors-the result is an overwhelming number of firms incorporating in Delaware).
27. For example, the court in Unocal held that the directors' decision to undertake a self-tender
to defeat a hostile takeover from a shareholder known to be a greenmailer was protected by the
business judgment rule as necessary to protect the shareholders and the corporate enterprise. 493
A.2d at 958. Greenmail refers to a practice of acquiring a substantial block of a company's shares,
and receiving a substantial premium for those shares from the corporation in a buy-back. The cor-
poration usually buys back shares held by a potential bidder when they perceive a threat from the
shareholder or an outsider, and the company wants to strengthen its position. See Block & Miller,
supra note 21, at 62. However, also in Unocal, the court stated that directors may consider other
constituencies (Le., creditors, customers, employees and possibly the community generally) when
deciding whether to reject a takeover bid. 493 A.2d at 955. These added considerations given to the
directors, especially in light of the increase in defensive mechanisms (e.g., "Pac-Man," self-tender,
"Poison Pill," etc.-to be discussed more fully later), may allow a director to reject a takeover
attempt, which may be in the shareholders' best interest, but conflict with another constituency.
This rejection could, arguably, be protected by the business judgment rule even though it's not
within the best interests of the shareholders, but the directors "believe" the rejection to be a valid
corporate decision.
28. For example, there is the "Pac-Man" defense, where a target company attempts its own
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cial, legal, and other reasons.29 Third, directors can consider other con-
stituencies (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, or the general
community) 30 when responding to a takeover attempt. Fourth, the stan-
dard for abuse of a director's business judgment is very difficult to
meet.31 The heavy burden is stacked against any challenger. Fifth, legis-
latures, by enacting antitakeover statutes,32 have placed their stamps of
approval upon directors' responses to takeovers. By implementing these
statutes, legislatures allow corporations to incorporate in their state with
built-in defensive mechanisms, thereby sanctioning their takeover re-
sponses as legitimate and rational business decisions. Lastly, this Note
will discuss the added implications of the Delaware Supreme Court's re-
cent decision of Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.
After examining the effects of Time, as meshed with current mergers
and acquisitions law, the Note concludes that the business judgment rule
has been expanded beyond its intended purpose, and that something
must be done to protect the rights of shareholders from expropriation.
I. BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
As a precursor to any discussion about which directors' decisions
the business judgment rule protects, the workings and parameters of the
rule must be set forth. Initially, a distinction must be made between the
intrinsic fairness standard33 and the business judgment rule, and when
each applies. Under the intrinsic fairness standard, the burden of proof
takeover of the would-be acquiring company (a counteroffer takeover). See Martin Marietta Corp.
v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982); Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1419. In
addition, there are various types of Share Purchase Rights Plans or "Poison Pills," whereby a pur-
chaser who reaches a certain percentage of stock ownership (30, 20, or 15%) triggers the Plan and
the remaining shareholders can redeem their present stock with the acquiring company's stock at a
2:1 ratio, therefore making the target company less appealing for a takeover since the value of the
acquiring company is diluted. See Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985) (court
upheld directors implementation of a Rights Plan to protect corporation from potential takeover);
Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1424. For a more thorough discussion of defensive mecha-
nisms, see infra notes 53-141.
29. See Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
30. Id. But cf Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182 (other constituencies are permissible to consider only if
there is also a "rationally related benefit accruing to the stockholders"). For a listing of the states
which include an "other constituencies" provision in their antitakeover statutes, see infra note 139.
31. The standard for director liability is gross negligence, closely approximating fraudulent be-
havior. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) and Post Smith, supra note 24, at 559.
32. For a list of the states which have enacted antitakeover statutes, see Note, The Delaware
Takeover Statute: Constitutionally Infirm even under the Market Participant Exception, 17 HOFSTRA
L. REV. 203 (1988).
33. Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971). The intrinsic fairness test shifts the
burden of proof onto the directors to prove, subject to careful judicial scrutiny, that its transaction
was objectively fair. Id. at 720. See also AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519
A.2d 103, 115 (Del. Ch. 1986).
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falls on the directors to justify their decisions. In contrast, under the
business judgment rule, directors enjoy a rebuttable presumption of
sound business judgment which will not be disturbed if the decision can
be attributed to any rational business purpose.34 In the latter circum-
stance, once the court determines that the directors have shown a ra-
tional basis for their decision, it will not substitute its own judgment for
that of the directors. 35 Under Delaware law, the cardinal precept of cor-
porate law is that directors, not shareholders, manage the business affairs
of the company. 36 From this premise flows certain fundamental fiduci-
ary obligations owed to the company and its shareholders. 37 Generally,
the courts recognize two components of the fiduciary obligation owed to
the company and shareholders. Not so coincidentally, these same two
components are part of the business judgment rule. The two components
are a duty of care and a duty of loyalty owed to both the company and
the shareholders.
38
A portion of the duty of care is satisfied when the directors make an
informed decision about whether a takeover offer is in the best interests
of the company. 39 In addition to an informed decision, the directors
must act in good faith and with an honest belief that the action taken is
in the best interests of the company 40 Also, the duty of care applies to
34. See, e.g., Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. Ill. 1982); Unocal Corp. v.
Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d at 954; Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720; Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v.
Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1239 (Del. Ch. 1988).
35. See cases cited supra note 34. While most business decisions are presumed to be of sound
business judgment, if the decision is a defensive reaction to a takeover bid, the directors must over-
come the burden placed upon them by Unocal. This burden is met when the directors act reasonably
in relation to the threat posed by the takeover bid. 493 A.2d at 955. Thus, all defensive actions
taken by a board must meet the Unocal "proportionality" test, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note
21, while non-defensive decisions are presumed sound.
36. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984). The Aronson court cited DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 8, § 141(a) (1982):
"The business and affairs of a corporation organized under this chapter shall be managed
by or under the direction of a board of directors .... "
Id. at 811. See also Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1154 (Del. 1989);
Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1341 (Del. 1987); Unocal, 493 A.2d at
953; Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 624 (Del. 1984).
37. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
38. Polk v. Good, 507 A.2d 531, 536 (Del. 1986). See also Ivanhoe, 535 A.2d at 1345; Smith v.
Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); Reder, supra note 21, at 276; Warden, The Boardroom
as a War Room: The Real World Applications of the Duty of Care and the Duty of Loyalty, 40 Bus.
LAW. 1431 (1985); Comment, Business Judgment Rule: A Benchmark for Evaluating Defensive Tac-
tics in the Storm of Hostile Takeovers, 31 VILL. L. REV. 1439, 1447 (1986) (Courts usually recognize
duty of care and a duty of loyalty as the two components to the business judgment rule).
39. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (an informed decision is made after the directors have con-
sidered all material information reasonably available to them); Comment, supra note 38, at 1447-48
(duty of care requires an informed decision about whether the takeover offer is in the target com-
pany's best interests).
40. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954;
Aronson, 473 A.2d at 812.
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directors' responses to either threats originating from third parties or
from other shareholders. 4' In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., the
Delaware Supreme Court added a further element to balance the duty of
care obligation. According to the court in Unocal:
[if] a defensive measure is to come within the ambit of the business
judgment rule, it must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
42
Thus, unless... the directors' decisions were primarily based on per-
petuating themselves in office, or some other breach of fiduciary duty
such as fraud, overreaching, lack of good faith, or being uninformed, a
Court will not substitute its judgment for that of the board.
43
To state Unocal's "proportionality test"" another way, "when the
business judgment rule applies to adoption of a defensive mechanism, the
initial burden will lie with the directors."14 The directors must have rea-
sonable grounds for believing that a danger poses a threat to company
policy and effectiveness, and the defensive mechanism must be reason-
able in relation to the threat posed.46 Many courts hold that when a
board consists of a majority of outside, independent directors and its de-
cision is in accordance with the foregoing standards, its decision is pro-
tected by the business judgment rule.
4 7
41. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955. But see Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 21, at
1199-1204. The authors suggest that directors should act passively in response to a takeover offer.
They suggest that any action taken by the directors after the takeover offer was made must be shown
to have been undertaken for the economic benefit of the company, and not merely undertaken to
defeat the offer. "They also suggest that directors should relax, not consult any experts, and let
shareholders decide." Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 21, at 1750.
42. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). For an extensive
discussion about the Unocal "proportionality" test, see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21.
43. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958. See also Block & Miller, supra note 21. The business judgment
rule does not shield directors' conduct which constitutes bad faith, fraud, overreaching, waste of
corporate assets, or abuse of discretion, all to the detriment of the shareholders. Id. at 50. See
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 293 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981)
(fraud, bad faith, gross overreaching or abuse of discretion); Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872 (same);
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619, 627 (Del. 1984) (same); Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717,
720 (Del. 1971) (same).
44. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21.
45. Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500 A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985). To see how the Unocal
test alters the presumption of sound business judgment afforded to non-defensive decisions, see supra
note 35.
46. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356; Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
47. See Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1343 (Del. 1987) (proof
that the board acted in good faith and upon reasonable investigation is materially enhanced when the
independent directors are in the majority); Moran, 500 A.2d at 1356 (same); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa
Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (same). See also Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix
Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623, 634 (D. Md. 1981), where the court noted the significance of the make-up
of Marietta's board; namely, that only two of the fourteen directors were part of Marietta's manage-
ment. But cf. Panter, 646 F.2d at 300-01 (Cudahy, J., dissenting). Judge Cudahy thought that a
majority of non-management (independent) directors on a company's board should not be disposi-
tive. The independents' interest in keeping "their" management, maintaining their reputations,
1989]
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In addition to successfully fulfilling the duty of care, the directors
must also fulfill the duty of loyalty. From the directors' status as a fidu-
ciary, the duty of loyalty requires that the directors act in the best inter-
ests of the shareholders. 48 Therefore, self-dealing, fraud, overreaching by
the directors, and the other Unocal prohibitions 49 apply to the duty of
loyalty as they do to the duty of care. If such behavior is shown to have
occurred during the directors' decisionmaking process, the directors are
not afforded the protection of the business judgment rule. Therefore,
mere good faith or an honest belief that the transaction was entirely fair
will not suffice, and the directors must prove that their decision was ob-
jectively or intrinsically fair.50
Starting from the premise that the business judgment rule protects
good faith and informed business decisions, a logical corollary concerns
the methods and factors (i.e., defensive mechanisms) that the directors
can utilize to thrust their decision within the ambit of the rule's
protection.
II. DEFENSIVE MECHANISMS
When directors make a corporate decision, ordinarily the decision
enjoys a presumption of sound business judgment, which can be over-
come only by a showing of a breach of a fiduciary duty (e.g., fraud, self-
dealing, perpetuation, etc.). 51 If the decision falls within the ambit of the
business judgment rule, the court will not substitute its own judgment, as
long as there is any rational business purpose attributed to the decision.
52
However, when directors take a defensive stance in response to a take-
over offer, the burden of proving that the directors' decision was an in-
formed decision shifts to the directors, and they must overcome the two
hurdles expressed in Unocal before their decision will fall within the am-
bit of the business judgment rule. First, the directors must have reason-
able grounds for believing that a threat to corporate policy and
effectiveness exists. Second, any defensive mechanism adopted by the di-
rectors must be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.53 These addi-
power, prestige, and prominence casts doubts on the premise that a majority of independent direc-
tors materially enhances the court's finding of good faith and reasonable investigation.
48. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
49. See cases cited supra note 43.
50. AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103, 115 (Del. Ch. 1986).
See also supra note 33 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
52. See cases cited supra note 34.
53. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985). See also Paramount
Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989); Moran v. Household Int'l Inc., 500
[Vol. 65:885
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tional duties are triggered because of the likelihood that the directors
may act primarily in their own interests during a takeover response (i.e.,
to defeat a tender offer and keep their board intact).
54
While the enhanced Unocal duty is not supposed to allow a corpora-
tion "to have unbridled discretion to defeat any perceived threat by any
Draconian means available," 55 most directors' decisions fall under the
expanded reach of the business judgment rule. One reason why direc-
tors' decisions almost always fall under the rule's protection is the in-
creasing number of defensive mechanisms within the directors' arsenal.
5 6
Directors not only have the right, but a duty to oppose any offer which
they believe will harm the corporation.
7
In recent years, the number of defensive mechanisms has only been
limited by the ingenuity of attorneys.58 For purposes of this Note, only
four recent, yet well-established defensive mechanisms will be discussed.
They are: (1) the Shareholder Rights Plan; (2) the sale of a valuable asset;
(3) a self-tender; and (4) a retaliation counter offer for the shares of the
attempted takeover company.
First, the Shareholder Rights Plan ("Poison Pill") was approved by
the Delaware Supreme Court in Moran v. Household International, Inc.59
Household's management adopted the Rights Plan, not in response to an
actual threat, but rather as a pre-takeover move to make the company
less vulnerable to a takeover attack.60 The Plan was implemented to
A.2d 1346, 1356 (Del. 1985); City Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 796 (Del. Ch. 1988);
AC Acquisitions, 519 A.2d at 113.
54. Revlon Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 180 (Del. 1986); Uno-
cal, 493 A.2d at 954. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, Takeover Bids, supra note 21. During a tender
offer, if a conflict of interest exists, the business judgment rule should not apply to directors' deci-
sions. Frequently, when a tender offer is made, the replacement of the incumbent managers would
appear inevitable if the tender offer was successful; therefore, the application of the business judg-
ment rule in these situations should be questioned. Id. at 1745.
55. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
56. Supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also Greene & Junewicz, A Reappraisal of Cur-
rent Regulation of Mergers and Acquisitions, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 682, 700-06 (1984), for a
discussion of the "Pac-Man," "scorched earth," "crown jewel," fair price, and "Poison Pill" de-
fenses; Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1414-26; Comment, supra note 38, at 1440-42.
57. Block & Miller, supra note 21, at 47; Comment, supra note 38, at 1452. See also Ivanhoe
Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987) (directors have both the duty
and responsibility to oppose threats); Unocal, 493 A.2d at 954 ("board's power to act derives from its
fundamental duty and obligation to protect the corporate enterprise... ").
58. The dominant defensive mechanisms have included: the "Poison Pill," "crown jewel,"
"white knight," "Pac-Man," and self-tender. For a more comprehensive discussion of the various
defensive mechanisms, see supra note 11. Also, with the addition of states' antitakeover statutes,
directors faced with a hostile takeover have an array of weaponry to thwart off the attack. See, e.g.,
Booth, The Promise of State Takeover Statutes, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1635 (1988); Hablutzel & Selmer,
Hostile Corporate Takeovers: History and Overview, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV. 203 (1988).
59. 500 A.2d 1346 (Del. 1985).
60. Id. at 1349.
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make takeovers, especially "bust-up" takeovers,6' more difficult. The
Plan contained two triggers: (1) where a tender offer for thirty percent of
Households shares was made, or (2) where any single entity or group
acquired a twenty percent block of Household shares. 62 If either of the
triggering events occurred, and a successful tender offer resulted, House-
hold shareholders could acquire shares of the tender offeror's company at
one-half the market value of the shares.
63
The Moran court upheld the Rights Plan as a valid exercise of the
directors' business judgment. Even though the court stated that the Plan
was "adopted to ward off possible future advances, and not a mechanism
adopted in reaction to a specific threat," 64 it held the Plan legitimate
because it did not destroy the assets of Household, impair Household's
financial flexibility or the market price of its stock, or usurp the share-
holders' right to receive tender offers.65 While the Plan deters virtually
all hostile tender offers, it is not absolute. Household's directors, if faced
with a tender offer, would still have to meet the Unocal test.66 Both in
enacting the Rights Plan (or any other defensive mechanism) and in de-
ciding whether to redeem the Plan during a takeover attempt, the direc-
tors had to satisfy the Unocal requirements of perceiving a threat to
corporate policy and effectiveness and adopting a defensive mechanism
reasonable in relation to the threat posed, 67 and by showing good faith
and reasonable investigation. 68 Since the Court believed that the House-
hold directors complied with these requirements, the directors' decision
to adopt the Rights Plan was a legitimate business decision, and there-
fore, was afforded the protection of the business judgment rule.
Before considering the other defensive mechanisms, Moran must be
distinguished from other cases because the Rights Plan was not adopted
in response to any actual takeover attempt, but rather to make any take-
over attempt more difficult to consummate. In contrast, the remaining
defensive mechanisms are done in response to a takeover attempt.
Therefore, other factors may be considered by the directors in determin-
ing whether to oppose the takeover offer and adopt a defensive stance.
These factors include the "inadequacy of the price offered, nature and
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1348.
63. Id. at 1349. For a discussion of Moran, see Comment, supra note 38, at 1460-67; Lipton &
Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1424.
64. Moran, 500 A.2d at 1350.
65. Id. at 1354.
66. Id.
67. See supra notes 35 and 45 and accompanying text.
68. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985) (citing Cheff v.
Mathes, 199 A.2d 548, 555 (Del. 1964)).
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timing of the offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies'
other than shareholders (i.e., creditors, customers, employees, and per-
haps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation, and
the quality of securities being offered in the exchange."
69
One caveat must be noted. While Unocal included consideration of
the impact of the takeover on "other constituencies," the same Delaware
Supreme Court, one year later in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrew & Forbes
Holdings, Inc., added that the consideration of "other constituencies,"
although permissible, has limitations. 70 In Revlon, the court held that
such considerations are only permissible when "there are rationally re-
lated benefits accruing to the stockholders.
71
The second type of defensive mechanism is the sale of a valuable
asset ("Crown Jewel") to another corporation (sometimes called a
"White Knight"), 72 to make the target company less attractive to the
potential acquiror.73 In Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, the court found that
the sale of an asset which makes a company less attractive to a tender
offeror can fall within the protection of the business judgment rule.
74
However, directors may not sell all of a company's assets in a "scorched
earth" policy 75 to thwart a takeover attempt and then expect to hide be-
hind the business judgment rule's protection. Another potential draw-
back of a "crown jewel" approach is that finding a friendly buyer for a
particular asset and then restructuring one's business to adjust for the
loss of the asset are time-consuming, complicated, and costly.
76
The third type of defensive mechanism is a self-tender, where the
company buys back its shares from its shareholders at a price substan-
tially above the bidder's price. 77 In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
69. Id.
70. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
71. Id.
72. Comment, supra note 38. "A 'white knight' is the friendly corporation with which a target
corporation arranges to merge in order to avoid being taken over by a raider." Id. at 1441 n.3. See
also Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1421, stating that issuing stock to a "friendly" holder
can be a valid defense to a hostile takeover. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 56, at 701, 705.
73. Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933 (N.D. Ill. 1982). See also Lipton & Brown-
stein, supra note 21. By selling off those assets that are most attractive to the bidder, the target may
cause the bidder to go away. Id. at 1418. "This tactic may be effective if the bidder values some
aspect of the target's assets more highly than does the target itself." Id.
74. Whittaker, 535 F. Supp. at 951.
75. A scorched earth policy concerns the directors attempt to defeat a hostile takeover attempt
by selling the company's assets until the company is rendered worthless. See Joseph E. Seagram &
Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860, 861 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (court refused to apply the business judg-
ment rule to the management's scorched earth policy to destroy the company rather than have their
tenure as directors ended by a raider who successfully takes over the company).
76. Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1419.
77. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985). See also Lipton & Brown-
stein, supra note 21, at 1416, noting that self-tenders pose two problems. First, using a self-tender
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the court upheld Unocal's discriminatory self-tender on the basis of the
business judgment rule. 78 The court believed that the self-tender, which
discriminated against Mesa (a 13% shareholder and a known green-
mailer),79 was reasonable in relation to the threat posed by Mesa's coer-
cive two-tier 80 offer that was inadequate in price and offered poor quality
securities (Le., junk bonds).8 1 The court approved of Unocal's sacrificing
one short-term shareholder (Mesa), who was a speculator, in the interests
of long-term loyal investors.82 Again, because the directors exercised
good faith and conducted a reasonable investigation, as required by their
duty to protect the corporate enterprise,8 3 the business judgment rule
protected their decision as having a rational business purpose.
8 4
The fourth type of defensive mechanism is to retaliate by making a
tender offer for the company making the takeover attempt. For example,
the court in Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp.,S5 upheld the "Pac-
Man' 8 6 defense as a valid defense to a takeover attempt. In Martin, Ben-
dix made a tender offer for Martin Marietta. Marietta responded by
making a counter tender offer for Bendix by borrowing enormous
may not appear attractive to shareholders faced with a takeover bidder's any-and-all cash tender
offer. Second, large-scale self-tender offers are only possible when a target has sufficient unrestricted
assets to support large borrowing or can successfully effectuate a crown jewel sale. Id. See also
Comment, supra note 38, at 1453-60, discussing Unocal.
78. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
79. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. See also Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21. A
greenmailer, who accumulates stock and poses a threat of a takeover attempt or proxy fight, does not
strive to acquire the company, but to be bought out at a good price. Id. at 1413. Such stock repur-
chases have been sustained by the courts under the business judgment rule, when such repurchases
are for a legitimate business purpose and not solely for entrenching management. Id. at 1414.
80. Two-tier offers are recognized as "classic coercive measure[s] designed to stampede share-
holders into tendering at the first tier, even if the price is inadequate, out of fear of what they will
receive at the back end of the transaction." Unocal, 493 A.2d at 956. See also Greene & Junewicz,
supra note 56, at 679-81; Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1412-13.
81. Junk bonds are typically high-yielding, low-credit bonds or preferred stocks, frequently
with variable rate or exchangeability options with warrants or other equity "kickers." Id. at 1411-
12. Junk bond financed deals subject the target company to a bust-up sale of assets to finance the
takeover. Id.
82. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955-56. See also Comment, supra note 38, at 1458-59.
83. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 958.
84. For a more in-depth discussion of Unocal, see Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum
Co., 72 VA. L. REV. 851 (1986); Comment, Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.: The Selective Self-
Tender - Fighting Fire with Fire, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109 (1985).
85. Martin Marietta Corp. v. Bendix Corp., 549 F. Supp. 623 (D. Md. 1982).
86. The "Pac-Man" defense refers to a target company's counteroffer for the shares of the
would-be acquiror. Block & Miller, supra note 21, at 64. The "Pac-Man" defense has certain
liabilities. First, it requires a great many unsecured assets or a large amount of free cash. Second, a
counteroffer waives the target's assertion of antitrust violation created by the merger, and implicitly
signifies a desirability by the target's board to merge. Lipton & Brownstein, supra note 21, at 1420.
For a discussion of Martin Marietta, see Greene & Junewicz, supra note 56, at 700-01.
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amounts of money to finance the tender offer.8 7 The court held that
Marietta's directors had acted in a manner reasonably believed to be
within the best interest of Bendix' shareholders. 8 Marietta's belief that
its tender offer would best suit its needs, rather than Bendix',89 was held
to be a valid reason for the counteroffer.
III. THE EFFECTS OF THE EXPANDED BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE
A. Cases that Seemingly Protect Shareholders
Next to the Unocal case, Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes
Holdings, Inc. is the most influential decision on a directors' duties dur-
ing a takeover attempt.90 Revlon is important because it limits the appli-
cability of Unocal when the company is up for sale. As the Revlon court
found, if it becomes "inevitable" that a target company will be sold, the
directors' duties change appreciably:
[t]he duty of the board had thus changed from the preservation of Rev-
lon as a corporate entity to the maximization of the company's value at
a sale for the shareholders' benefit. This significantly altered the
board's responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced
threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders'
interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole question of defen-
sive measures became moot. The directors' role changed from defend-
ers of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the
best price for the stockholders at a sale of the company. 91
In Revlon, a bidding war for Revlon between a hostile party and a
friendly bidder resulted in a lock-up 92 agreement and a no-shop 93 provi-
sion with the friendly bidder; however, the directors had already author-
ized management to sell the company. The court found that the buyout
and lock-up agreement with the friendly bidder, Forstmann Little, signi-
fied that the Revlon directors were amenable to the idea of selling the
87. Martin Marietta, 549 F. Supp. at 625. See also Greene & Junewicz, supra note 56, at 700
n.262.
88. Bendix was a shareholder in Marietta, and therefore, Marietta's decision to make a counter-
offer had to take account of both Bendix' and Marietta's shareholders' interests. Martin Marietta,
549 F. Supp. at 633.
89. Id.
90. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
91. Id. at 182. See also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334 (Del.
1987) (discussing when Revlon and Unocal duties kick in); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at
253 n.26; Reder, supra note 21.
92. A lock-up option is an arrangement under which a target agrees to sell part of its assets to a
friendly suitor if the raider obtains control of the target. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178, 182-84; Comment,
supra note 38, at 1441 n.3.
93. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 178, 184. A no-shop provision prevents a target company from enter-
taining any additional takeover bids. See also Comment, supra note 38, at 1477.
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company. 94 At that point, the "sale" of Revlon was inevitable and the
directors' role changed from a defender to an auctioneer. 95 Therefore,
determining when a sale of the company occurs is a critical question.
The directors' determination could either: (1) require the Unocal "pro-
portionality" test, or (2) require the Revlon auction standard.96
Because there is no consensus 97 concerning the appropriate behavior
of directors under attack by a hostile takeover, the directors' survival
instinct governs takeover responses.9 In addition to the litany of factors
that Unocal stated are permissible for a director to consider during a
takeover,99 the standard for proving that a board of directors has acted
with such gross negligence as to place its decision outside the protection
of the business judgment rule seems insurmountable.
The Delaware Supreme Court in Aronson v. Lewis,100 held that
"under the business judgment rule director liability is predicated upon
concepts of gross negligence."' 101 More recently, the court reaffirmed the
gross negligence standard 10 2 and expressed an opinion as to what "mini-
mum" requirements a director must meet. First, the court stated that
fulfilling a fiduciary obligation "requires more than the mere absence of
bad faith or fraud."10 3
[The directors] cannot succumb to influences which convert an other-
wise valid business decision into a faithless act. On the other hand, the
duty of care requires a director, when making a business decision, to
proceed with a 'critical eye' by acting in an informed and deliberate
manner respecting the corporate merits of an issue before the board. 14
Therefore, the requirement that a business judgment must be an in-
formed one requires that the directors inform themselves about all mate-
rial information reasonably available to them before making a
94. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182; Comment, supra note 38, at 1478.
95. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182. But see Reder, supra note 21, at 280-82, stating that a simple
"change in control" attack does not trigger the Revlon duties. Only when it is clear that the target is
going to be broken up and its effectiveness destroyed do Revlon duties arise.
96. Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 253 n.26.
97. Greene & Junewicz, supra note 56, at 700 n.265.
98. Id. at 700.
99. These factors included: the "inadequacy of the price offered, the nature and timing of the
offer, questions of illegality, the impact on 'constituencies' other than shareholders (ie., creditors,
customers, employees, and perhaps even the community generally), the risk of nonconsummation,
and the quality of securities being offered in the exchange." Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,
493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
100. 473 A.2d 805 (Del. 1984).
101. Id. at 812. See also Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 722 (Del. 1971) (fraud or
gross and palpable overreaching); supra note 43 and accompanying text.
102. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985). See also Post Smith, supra note 24.
103. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
104. Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d 1334, 1345 (Del. 1987). See also




On the basis of that line of reasoning, the Delaware Supreme Court
in Smith v. Van Gorkom held that the directors' decision to enter into a
merger agreement was uninformed and grossly negligent. Therefore, the
court would not defer to the directors' decision as a valid exercise of the
business judgment rule. Several factors contributed to the court's deci-
sion. First, the directors accepted an offer without investigating whether
a higher price could be obtained, and without investigating the value of
its company prior to the sale.t °1 6 Second, the directors "were grossly neg-
ligent in approving the 'sale' of the company upon two hours considera-
tion, without prior notice, and without the exigency of a crisis or
emergency." 10 7 Also, at the board meeting, no documents concerning
the merger agreement were present. The directors relied entirely upon
CEO Van Gorkom's twenty minute oral presentation. 08 In addition to
the fact that Van Gorkom himself came up with the fifty-five dollar per
share offer price,' °9 and that no documentation was given as to the ade-
quacy of the fifty-five dollar price per share offer, the "widespread view
of Senior Management [was] that the timing of the offer was wrong and
the offer inadequate."' 10 Lastly, the court considered the impact that the
merger agreement had on the company-namely, that it precluded the
company from receiving or soliciting any other offers."'I As a result of
these findings, the court denied the directors the protection of the busi-
ness judgment rule, and the case was remanded to determine an award of
damages. "1
2
B. Cases Illustrating Directors' Power
While one may think that the "gross negligence" standard of direc-
tor liability, the Unocal "proportionality test," and the Revlon "auction"
limitation to Unocal adequately protect shareholders' interests, the above
checks and balances are pro-director and are relatively safe from attack
105. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 872.
106. Id. at 874. See also Post Smith, supra note 24, at 559.
107. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874. See also Post Smith, supra note 24, at 562-63.
108. See case cited supra note 107.
109. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 877 n.19.
110. Id. at 877.
111. Thus, this aspect of the Merger Agreement acted similar to the no-shop provision struck
down by the Revlon court. See supra note 93.
112. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 893 (Del. 1985). For a discussion of Van Gorkom,
see Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40 Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985).
Fischel notes that the Trans Union (Van Gorkom) case sent a signal to firms to obtain fairness letters
or similar documents from outside consultants before making decisions to change the corporation.
He further asserts that shareholders are the biggest losers after Trans Union, because a company can
always procure an expert to state that a tender price is a fair market premium price. Id. at 1453.
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by disgruntled shareholders. The general consensus that shareholders
are "protected" is exemplified by one scholar's statement that the "Van
Gorkom decision stripped corporate directors and officers of the protec-
tive cloak formerly provided by the business judgment rule .... " 13 The
discussion that follows disputes that statement, as well as the view that
shareholders are adequately protected.
An important factor that materially enhances a board of director's
decision as one made in good faith is that the decision was made by a
board comprised of a majority of independent directors.114 Having a
board thus composed lessens the probability that the board acted out of
motives that are designed to entrench their positions in the corpora-
tion.115 However, in the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeal's decision in
Panter v. Marshall Field & Co.,1 6 Judge Cudahy stated in his dissenting
opinion that:
[t]he fact that Field's may have had a majority of non-management
(independent) directors is hardly dispositive. The interaction between
management and board may be very strong even where, as here, a rela-
tionship of symbiosis seems to prevail over the normal condition of
"management domination."
[Tihe very idea that, if we cannot trace with precision a mighty flow of
dollars into the pockets of each of the outside directors, these directors
are necessarily disinterested arbiters of the stockholders' destiny, is ap-
pallingly naive.
Directors of a New York Stock Exchange-listed company are, at
the very least, "interested" in their own positions of power, prestige,
and prominence . . . . They are "interested" in defending against
outside attack[s against] the management which they have, in fact, in-
stalled or maintained in power-"their" management (to which, in
many cases, they owe their directorships). And they are "interested"
in maintaining the public reputation of their own leadership and stew-
ardship against the claims of "raiders" who say that they can do
better. "1
7
These concerns seriously call into question the blind faith that courts
have placed on such directors' decisions."
t8
113. Post Smith, supra note 24, at 559.
114. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
115. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also Panter, 646 F.2d at 300 n.1 ("hostile
tender offers unavoidably create a conflict of interest..., [because] nearly all directors and manag-
ers are interested in maintaining their compensations and perquisites"); Warner Communications,
Inc. v. Murdoch, 581 F. Supp. 1482, 1491 (D. Del. 1984) (ifa target company fails to exercise its
business judgment and engages instead in entrenchment tactics, such defensive actions are
illegitimate).
116. 646 F.2d 271 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
117. Id. at 300-01 (Cudahy, J., dissenting).
118. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
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Furthermore, Judge Cudahy argued that the Panter decision shred-
ded any remaining constraints which would preclude directors from
placing their own interests before the interests of the shareholders when
responding to a takeover offer. 119 In a harsh critique of the majority's
decision, Judge Cudahy:
emphatically disagree[d] that the business judgment rule should clothe
directors, battling blindly to fend off a threat to their control, with an
almost irrebuttable presumption of sound business judgment, prevail-
ing over everything but the elusive hob goblins of fraud, bad faith or
abuse of discretion.
120
Judge Cudahy's dissenting opinion goes to the heart of the problem
associated with the business judgment rule. First and foremost, the
"gross negligence" standard is too stringent a requirement for sharehold-
ers to meet. While the Van Gorkom court expressly stated that neither
an outside valuation study (to determine the value of the company) nor a
fairness opinion by an independent investment banker is required to sup-
port an informed business judgment,1 21 the Van Gorkom decision has
implicitly given mergers and acquisition players its stamp of approval on
the use of valuation studies and fairness opinions to render a board's
decision informed. 122 This conclusion seems reasonable in light of the
difficulty in proving gross negligence, fraud, and self-dealing.
Another example of the insurmountable odds that shareholders face
when they challenge the board of directors' decisions is the "scorched
earth" policy involved in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York's decision in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons.
123
119. 646 F.2d at 299. The Panter court upheld a board's decision to reject a takeover offer based
on its preference to remain an independent company. Thus, a board's desire to build value within
the company is a rational business purpose for rejecting a takeover believed to diminish the value of
the company. Id. at 296. The directors' decision to "just say no" to a takeover not thought to be in
the best interests of the company has been upheld as a valid defensive decision. See Amanda Acqui-
sitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496, 499 n.4 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367
(1989); Panter, 646 F.2d 271; Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980).
The Panter majority also upheld, under the business judgment rule, the board's decision to file
an antitrust suit as a defensive block to the takeover attempt. 646 F.2d at 297. Such a suit chal-
lenges the legality of the takeover attempt. Id. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d
946, 955 (Del. 1985), for the litany of factors directors can consider when deciding to reject or
effectuate the takeover offer. See also Whittaker Corp. v. Edgar, 535 F. Supp. 933, 950 (N.D. Ill.
1982) (Section 7 of the Clayton Act allows a private right of action to obtain an injunction against an
unlawful acquisition posed by a takeover bid); Block & Miller, supra note 21, at 55.
120. Panter, 646 F.2d at 299.
121. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985).
122. Fischel, supra note 112, at 1453.
123. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp. 860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981). See also Block &
Miller, supra note 21, at 61, stating that partial or complete liquidation of the target by its board
(scorched-earth defense) rests on the target's assumption that the entity is worth more "dead than
alive." However, most state corporation laws, including Delaware's, require sales of "all or substan-
tially all" of a company's assets to be submitted for shareholder approval, but the term "all or
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The "scorched earth" violation, as well as the gross negligence perpe-
trated in Van Gorkom, demonstrate the extremity that directors must
accomplish before the courts will interject into their decisions. With the
exception of these two extreme cases, directors have carte blanche to de-
termine the destiny of their shareholders' company.
An added weapon provided to directors to thwart a hostile takeover
is the antitakeover statute which many states have enacted over the past
few years. 124 Directors using these statutes as a basis for implementing a
defensive mechanism now have the stamp of approval of the state's
legislature.
After the United States Supreme Court in CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America 125 upheld the constitutionality of the Indiana Control
Share Acquisitions Statute, the states were given the green light to pro-
mulgate antitakeover statutes. The CTS decision, therefore, makes the
Court's decision to strike down Illinois' first generation 126 antitakeover
substantially all" is narrowly construed; thereby many transactions involving the sale of assets never
reach the shareholders. Id. at 62.
124. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-1201 to 1223 (Supp. 1988); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN §§ 33-374a to 374c (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 203 (Supp. 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§§ 607.109-.110 (West Supp. 1988); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-2-1131 to 1133 (Supp. 1988); HAW.
REV. STAT. §§ 415-171 to 172 (1985 & Supp. 1987); IDAHO CODE §§ 30-1601 to 1614, 30-1701 to
1710 (Supp. 1988); Illinois Corporate Takeover Law, Public Act 86-126 (effective Aug. 2, 1989);
IND. CODE ANN. §§ 23-1-42-1 to 11, 23-1-42-1 to 24 (West Supp. 1988); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 271B.I-010-271B.18-060 (Michie/Bobbs-Merill Supp. 1989); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12:135-
:140.2 (West Supp. 1988); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 611-A (Supp. 1988); MD. Bus. REG.
CODE ANN. §§ 3-202, 3-601 (1985); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. chs. IlOC-I10E (West Supp. 1988);
MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. §§ 450.1775-.1784 (West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 302A.671,
302A.673 (West Supp. 1989); Miss. CODE ANN. §§ 79-25-1 to 9 (Supp. 1988); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§§ 351.407, 351.459 (Vernon Supp. 1989); NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 21-2431 to 2453 (Supp. 1988); NEV.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 78.378-.3793 (Michie Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 14A:IOA-1 to 6 (West
Supp. 1988); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §§ 513, 912 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 55-9-01-55-
9A-09 (Supp. 1990); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 1701.83-.85 (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1987); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 1145-1155 (West Supp. 1989); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 35-2-101 to 111, 35-2-201
to 226 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1988); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 48-35-201 to 209, 48-35-301 to 312 (1988);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-6-1 to 12 (Supp. 1988); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 13.1-725 to 727 (Supp. 1988);
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 23A.50.010-.901 (Supp. 1989); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 180.726 (West
Supp. 1988).
125. 481 U.S. 69 (1987).
126. The first generation statutes were the states' first attempts to codify provisions into law that
would enable in-state corporations to protect themselves against hostile takeovers. These statutes
met their demise with the Supreme Court's decision in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982).
See Hablutzel & Selmer, Hostile Corporate Takeovers" History and Overview, 8 N. ILL. U.L. REV.
203, 210-13 (1988).
The next form of takeover statutes, second generation statutes, was given some approval by the
Supreme Court's decision in CTS. However, the second generation statutes came in three different
forms: business combination, fair price, and control share acquisition statutes. A business combina-
tion statute precludes any person who buys, for example, 20% or more of a company's stock from
acquiring the company for a certain period of time (e.g., five years) unless the purchaser of stock had
board approval to purchase the stock. Id. at 214. A fair price statute requires shareholders to vote
to ratify any business combinations, unless two-thirds of the disinterested directors approve the busi-
ness combination or all shareholders receive a fair price for their shares, as computed by a specific
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statute in Edgar v. MITE Corp.127 less prohibitive to states attempting to
formulate an antitakeover statute which can pass constitutional muster.
The Indiana Act involved in CTS provides states with a model with
which to compare their own statutes. The states were given an added
shot of confidence when the Seventh Circuit upheld the constitutionality
of Wisconsin's Anti-Takeover Statute. 128 Seventh Circuit Judge Easter-
brook, who strongly believes in director passivity during takeovers,
t29
wrote the opinion in Amanda Acquisition Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp.
upholding the Wisconsin law, even though he stated that "[1like our col-
leagues who decided MITE and CTS, we believe that antitakeover legis-
lation injures shareholders." 3 0  The problem associated with
antitakeover statutes is that they preclude shareholders from receiving or
accepting a premium offer. Thus, shareholders and the economy are
worse off because the higher bid reflects the better use to which the bid-
der can put the target's assets to.'
3 '
For instance, Wisconsin's Anti-Takeover Statute does not add op-
tions to a company's desire to give its directors more discretion to deter-
mine the salability of a takeover offer; instead, it destroys the possibility
of divergent choices. 3 2 Under the Wisconsin law, "[u]nless the target's
board agrees to the transaction in advance, the bidder must wait three
years after buying the shares to merge with the target or acquire more
than 5% of its assets." 33 While the Seventh Circuit stated its dislike and
skepticism of antitakeover statutes, it concluded that such skepticism
does not mean that the law is beyond the state's power. '34
formulation. Id. Lastly, a control share acquisition statute applies to acquisitions of shares which
surpass a threshold as established by the directors (e.g., one-fifth, one-third, or a majority of the
voting power). Thus, such acquisitions are prohibited unless the acquiror procures prior authoriza-
tion by obtaining a majority vote of both shareholders and disinterested shareholders. Id. at 214-15.
For a comparison of the three forms of second generation statutes, see generally id. at 226-29.
After the Supreme Court, in CTS, upheld the constitutionality of Indiana's statute, many states
enacted third generation statutes assuming that the CTS decision placed its general stamp of ap-
proval on all forms of antitakeover statutes. See Steinberg, Federal Preemption of State Anti-takeover
Statutes: The Time for Congressional Action is Now, 16 SEC. REG. L.J. 80, 83-85 (1988); Johnson &
Millon, Does the Williams Act Preempt State Common Law in Hostile Takeovers?, 16 SEC. REG. L.J.
339 (1989). Both of the above cited articles provide support for the argument that the Williams Act
may preempt states from regulating merger activity via state antitakeover statutes.
127. 457 U.S. 624 (1982). The Supreme Court held that Illinois' Anti-Takeover Statute was
unconstitutional, because it violated the Williams Act and the Commerce Clause.
128. Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
129. See Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 21.
130. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 500.
131. Id. at 500-01. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 21.
132. Amanda, 877 F.2d at 502.
133. Id. at 497-98.
134. Id. at 502.
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The significance of the antitakeover statutes is that legislatures have
now condoned the directors' use of defensive mechanisms. How can a
court, confronted with a board's implementation of a defensive mecha-
nism sanctioned by a state legislature135 and by the United States
Supreme Court, 36 hold that the board's action falls outside the scope of
the business judgment rule-especially in light of the gross negligent
standard for abusive behavior? Thus, these statutes only legitimize the
shareholders' feelings that they have no say in the control of "their"
company.
The following example illustrates the potency of these statutes. On
August 2, 1989, Governor Thompson of Illinois signed into law major
amendments to the Illinois Business Corporation Act as it relates to cor-
porate takeovers. 37 One of the most profound provisions, promulgated
in 1985, concerned the legislature's granting directors the option of con-
sidering the impact of the takeover on "other constituencies,"'' 3 but only
in the context of considering the best long-term and short-term interests
of the company. 39 The significance of this provision is that directors,
who are supposed to make corporate decisions to maximize shareholder
welfare, can now justify their decisions by considering the impact of their
135. See statutes cited supra note 124.
136. See CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America, 481 U.S. 69 (1987); Edgar v. MITE Corp.,
457 U.S. 624 (1982); Amanda Acquisitions Corp. v. Universal Foods Corp., 877 F.2d 496 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 367 (1989).
137. Illinois Corporate Takeover Law, Public Act 86-126 (effective Aug. 2, 1989 amended
§§ 6.05, 8.85, and adding § 11.75).
138. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985), stating that direc-
tors can consider "other constituencies" (e.g., employees, creditors, the community, etc.) when con-
sidering a takeover attempt. See also Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506
A.2d 173, 182 (Del. 1986), where the court imposed a limitation on the consideration of "other
constituencies." Cf. Eizenstat & Fullerton, Crying Wolf on Takeovers, NAT'L L.J. 13 (1989). The
recently passed Exon-Florio provision of the Omnibus Trade Act provides another consideration for
directors during a takeover attempt. However, the Exon-Florio provision was initially designed to
apply to friendly transactions, not to be misused by directors opposing hostile takeovers. The Exon-
Florio provision authorizes the President to investigate and block foreign acquisitions that pose a
security risk. The potential abuse arises because every company is in a national security business
when threatened by an unwanted suitor. This article demonstrates the breadth of the "other constit-
uencies" consideration, namely that directors can consider the effects of the takeover bid on the
national security interests of the United States of America. See also Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper
Role, supra note 21, at 1190-92; Reder, supra note 21. "[I]f a benefit to the stockholders can be
found, the directors appear able to consider the aggregate of their 'constituencies,' not just their
shareholders." Id. at 278.
139. Supra note 137, at § 8.85 and supra note 138 and accompanying text. Other states that
have similar provisions include: Arizona, ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10-1202(A) (1987); Idaho,
IDAHO CODE § 30-1702 (1988); Indiana, IND. CODE § 23-1-35-1(d) (1988); Kentucky, Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 271B.12-210(4) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1989); Maine, ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-
A, § 716 (1989); Minnesota, MINN. STAT. § 302A.251(5) (1988); Missouri, Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 351.347 (1988); Nebraska, NEB. REV. STAT. § 21-1983 (1989); New Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 53-11-35(D) (1987); Ohio, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1701.59(E) (Anderson 1988); Pennsylvania,
42 PA. CONS. STAT. § 8363 (1989); and Wisconsin, Wis. STAT. § 180.305 (1987).
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decisions on other groups (e.g., customers, creditors, and the commu-
nity). The interests of these other groups, however, may not necessarily
comport with shareholder interests or wishes.
In addition to state legislatures condoning directors' decisions and
the litany of factors that a director can consider when responding to a
takeover,' 40 the general ease of meeting the business judgment standard
makes almost any business decision fall within its protection.1 4' After
all, under the business judgment rule, the directors' decision will not be
disturbed if it can be attributed to any rational business purpose. 1 42 The
ease with which one can formulate any "rational" business purpose has
the effect of immunizing any directors' decisions from judicial scrutiny-
save for the rare cases where the board acts with gross negligence or
utilizes fraud, overreaching, or a scorched earth policy. The Delaware
Supreme Court's most recent decision on the propriety of directors' ac-
tions during a hostile takeover is the culmination of directors' carte
blanche ability to unilaterally decide the viability of a corporation.
IV. PARAMOUNT COMMUNICATIONS V TIME, INC
Illustrative of the abusive treatment shareholders have faced and
will continue to face is the Delaware Supreme Courts' most recent deci-
sion, Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc.143 According to one
source, the Time decision may have changed the world for all corporate
managers, directors, shareholders, and potential acquirors. 144 The Time
decision has enlarged the power of corporate directors in that they can
run the company as they see fit without seeking a shareholder vote on
major decisions. 145 Most notably, Time calls into question the validity of
Unocal's requirement that takeover responses must be "reasonable" in
relation to the threat posed.
Paramount and various Time shareholders sued Time in a Delaware
Chancery Court seeking an injunction restraining Time from consum-
mating a merger with Warner Communications.' 46 On July 14, 1989,
140. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
141. For example, if in Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 876 (Del. 1985), the board was
fully informed, their accumulation of tax credits would have been an adequate reason to enter into
merger negotiations. Also, if the directors in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Abrams, 510 F. Supp.
860 (S.D.N.Y. 1981), had only sold some assets or put the sale of assets decision to a shareholder
vote, their decision would have fallen within the ambit of the business judgment rule. See supra note
123 and accompanying text.
142. See cases cited supra note 34.
143. 571 A.2d 1140 (Del. 1989).
144. A Legal Victoryfor the Long Term, FORTUNE, August 14, 1989, at 56.
145. Wall St. J., July 25, 1989, at All, col. 1.
146. Time, 571 A.2d at 1141-42.
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Chancellor William T. Allen refused to issue the injunction because he
believed that the plaintiffs would be unable to prevail on the merits. 14 7
Plantiffs filed an interlocutory appeal, which the Delaware Supreme
Court accepted on an expedited basis. On July 24, 1989, the court orally
affirmed Chancellor Allen's ruling. A revised written opinion was issued
March 9, 1990.
A. The Genesis of the Time- Warner Merger Agreement 148
In 1983-84, Time, one of the largest suppliers of information to the
populace, 149 decided to expand its entertainment and media markets. 50
Seeking to serve a global economy, Time's management sought out an
expansive long-term goal. 15' However, because Time wanted to maintain
its independence and distinctive and important "Time Culture,"'' 52 the
board attempted to look for a company with which Time could merge,
and yet, achieve all of its goals (global economy and Time culture).
In spring 1987, Time's management contacted Warner concerning a
joint venture; however, these discussions never led to a definitive propo-
sal. 153 As an alternative to the failed joint venture with Warner, in July
147. Id. at 1142.
148. For a comprehensive explanation of the Time/Warner merger, see Saporito, The Inside
Story of TIME WARNER, FORTUNE, Nov. 20, 1989, at 164.
149. Time's business was divided into four divisions: publication of magazines (Time, People,
Fortune, Sports Illustrated, etc.); publication of books (Book-of-the-month club, Little, Brown & Co.,
Time-Life Books, etc.); production of pay television programs HBO and CINEMAX; and ownership
and operation of cable television franchises. Id. at 170.
150. Time's desire to expand its video market created a need to own a video or film products
company to supply films to its HBO and CINEMAX programs or fall mercy to the quality and price
whims of unfriendly suppliers. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1143-44
(Del. 1989).
151. "In 1987, Time established a special committee of executives to consider and propose cor-
porate strategies for the 1990s." Id. at 1143.
152. Time's "culture" stems from its desire to remain independent and its "pride in the history
of [its] firm--notably Time Magazine and its role in American life-and its managerial philosophy
and distinctive structure that is intended to protect journalistic integrity from pressures from the
business side of the [Time] enterprise." Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, at 6-
7 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989) (LEXIS, States Library, Del.); Time, 571 A.2d at 1143 n.4, 1152. See also
supra note 119 and accompanying text. Time's unique structure of having the Editor in Chief report
directly to a special committee of the board of directors protected its "culture" or value of journalis-
tic independence, which Time had found to have been economically advantageous. Time, No.
10866, at 9 [LEXIS]. However, the court stated that since Time's magazine business contributes
about 40% to its gross revenue, and will contribute about 20-25% of the merged Time-Warner's
revenues, then some other motivation besides protecting journalistic integrity might be underlying
Time's assertion of the defense of "culture." Id. See also What is Corporate Culture?, THE BANK-
ERS MAGAZINE, Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 33-34, describing in detail the factors comprising a bank's corpo-
rate culture. For example, the company's personality (i.e., culture) is comprised of patterns (beliefs,
behaviors, and assumptions) shared by members of an organization and learned over time as a result
of past successes. Such a culture is durable, resistant to change, and requires significant time and
resources for modification. Id.
153. Time, 571 A.2d at 1144. After Time management reviewed many studios (e.g., Disney,
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1988, Time's board approved negotiation of a merger agreement with
Warner provided, however, that certain conditions be met. 54 Negotia-
tions were shaky because the parties could not agree on a management
structure that satisfied Time's need to ensure continuation of its "cul-
ture"-which required the ultimate succession of Time executives to the
senior executive positions. 155 They finally agreed to a twenty-four mem-
ber board equally divided between incumbent directors of both compa-
nies. However, discussions again broke off in August because of
disagreement concerning who would succeed as the chief executive
officer. '
5 6
In January 1989, negotiation reopened and the companies finally
agreed to the succession of Nick Nicholas, Time's President and Chief
Operating Officer, as the sole CEO of the New Time-Warner Corpora-
tion. 157 The merger agreement consisted of a stock for stock deal that
provided Warner shareholders with a 12% premium.'15 The agreement
was approved by both boards on March 3, 1989. Such a stock deal re-
quired Time to submit the merger agreement for shareholder
approval. 159
Before Time obtained the necessary shareholder approval, however,
on June 7, 1989, Paramount made a $175 per share cash offer' 6° for all of
Time's outstanding common stock.' 6 1 The shareholder plaintiffs felt that
MCA-Universal, Columbia, 20th Century Fox, Warner, and Paramount), Warner was considered
the best fit, based on its outstanding video and film production capacity and talent, and a substantial
and effective international marketing relationship. Id. at 1144-45.
154. The negotiations were conditionally approved by a large majority of outside directors, not a
unanimous number. The approval was conditional on a "corporate governance" issue, namely that
Time's senior management must be assured succession to the ultimate control of the combined en-
tity. Id. See also supra notes 47 and 54 and accompanying text, self-preservation decisions by the
board are not protected by the business judgment rule.
155. Time, 571 A.2d at 1145. See also supra note 152 and accompanying text.
156. Time, 571 A.2d at 1145.
157. Id.
158. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, at 11 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(LEXIS, States Library, Del.). The Delaware Supreme Court's opinion does not discuss the percent-
age of premium that Warner shareholders would receive, only that an exchange ratio of .465 was
agreed upon, which gave Warner shareholders 62% ownership of Time-Warner. Paramount Com-
munications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1146 (Del. 1989). The Share Exchange Agreement gave
each party the option of automatically obtaining shares of the company should the merger fail to be
completed. Time, 571 A.2d at 1146. Warner did trigger its share rights in Time (11%) after the
Paramount bid. Time, No. 10866, at 12 [LEXIS].
159. Time, 571 A.2d at 1146.
160. Id. at 1147. However, Paramount's offer contained the following conditions: (1) termina-
tion of the Time-Warner merger agreement; (2) termination of the Share Exchange Agreement; (3)
approval of all franchise transfers; (4) redemption of Time's poison-pill plan and removal of other
defensive devices; (5) financing and majority acceptance by Paramount; and (6) judicial determina-
tion that Delaware's Anti-Takeover Statute was inapplicable to a Time-Paramount merger. Id.
161. Paramount's any-and-all cash offer is different from a coercive two-tier offer. See supra
note 80 and accompanying text. While the board does not have to act passively when confronted
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the signing of the merger agreement, with its effect of "changing" control
over Time, put Time in "Revlon Mode"'' 62 and required Time to seek the
best available transaction for the shareholders.' 63 The effect of Para-
mount's offer caused Time's stock to jump forty-four points in one
day. 164 Time's management immediately attacked Paramount for
tendering a "smoke and mirrors" offer.' 65 Then, Richard Munro, Time's
Chairman and CEO, stated both that Time had a binding deal with
Warner and that Time was not for sale. He added that he would not
even consider what Paramount might be willing to offer on a negotiated
basis. ' 66 Time ultimately did consider Paramount's offer, but the consen-
sus of the board was that Time was under a commitment to the Warner
deal.' 67 After further negotiations with Warner, Time decided to offi-
cially reject the Paramount offer and change the Warner transaction
from a stock deal to a cash acquisition of a majority stake in Warner
with an any-and-all cash offer at a fair price, "a defensive step that includes a coercive self-tender (or
forced merger as in Time) timed to effectively preclude a rational shareholder from accepting the
any-and-all offer cannot, in my opinion, be deemed to be reasonable in relation to any minimal threat
posed to stockholders by such offer." AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d
103, 114 (Del. Ch. 1986). See also Robert M. Bass Group, Inc. v. Evans, 552 A.2d 1227, 1243-44
(Del. Ch. 1988) (depriving shareholders of choosing between an any-and-all offer and a less attrac-
tive offer is unreasonable, directors, as fiduciaries, cannot "cram down" the shareholders' throat a
less attractive offer in order to "protect" the shareholders from a non-coercive, economically supe-
rior offer-"under Unocal, the directors were obligated to give the shareholders a choice"); City
Capital Assoc. v. Interco, Inc., 551 A.2d 787, 798 (Del. Ch. 1988) (there may come a time when a
board's fiduciary duty will require the board to permit the shareholders to choose between a nonco-
ercive offer and another alternative); Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 259 ("threats" imposed
by a noncoercive come from the directors' belief that shareholders will mistakenly accept the offer).
Also, discussing whether Unocal provides directors with a screen to unilaterally block shareholders
from choosing at all. Id. But cf. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153, where the court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the only threat an all-cash offer poses to shareholders is an inadequate value. The
court stated that plaintiffs' argument was "a narrow and rigid construction of Unocal." Id. Further-
more, the court held that Time's board was not "'cramming down' on its shareholders a manage-
ment-sponsored alternative, but rather had as its goal the carrying forward of a pre-existing
transaction in an altered form." Id. at 1155 (footnote omitted).
162. Id. at 1149. See also supra note 95 and accompanying text. In Time, plaintiffs contended
that the Warner merger constituted an implicit decision, as in Revlon, by Time to transfer control of
the company to Warner-the 62% ownership by Warner after the merger formed the basis of the
plaintiffs' argument. Time, 571 A.2d at 1146. Defendants countered that the merger was not in-
tended to sell or transfer control of Time, but to preserve and improve Time's long-term perform-
ance. Id. at 1144-45.
163. Id. at 1149.
164. See Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, at 13 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(LEXIS, States Library, Del.), for a listing of the increased price of Time's and Warner's shares after
the Paramount offer.
165. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1147 (Del. 1989).
166. Time, No. 10866, at 13-14 [LEXIS]. For an argument that directors should allow share-
holders to choose between alternative offers, see supra note 161.
167. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1148, where the Time board stated that the Paramount deal was
inadequate and posed a threat to Time's retention of its "culture," while the Warner deal was a
much more attractive deal.
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followed by a merger for cash, securities, or a combination of both. 168
This alternative became the more attractive course to consummate the
merger because it did not require shareholder approval as the stock deal
had. 169
However, one problem resulted from Time's decision to switch the
method of consummating the merger with Warner. There was some
question whether Time's shareholders would applaud the rejection of a
$175 per share cash offer and give management additional years to man-
age the value of Time shares to levels substantially higher than the $175
offer amount. 170 Therefore, the directors felt that the alternative mode of
acquisition was necessary to consummate the Warner deal and avoid
shareholders' temptation to grab the Paramount cash offer and run. 171
There were other problems associated with the cash acquisition.
First, whereas the original stock deal provided Warner shareholders with
a 12% premium for their shares, the new cash acquisition provided them
with a 56% premium.1 72 Second, as a result of the cash acquisition,
Time would incur $10 billion in debt, severely reducing its ability to sup-
port additional borrowing. 173 Third, reported earnings of the new entity
were expected to be eliminated by the amortization of approximately $9
billion of goodwill. 1
74
On June 23, 1989, in response to Time's revised merger agreement,
Paramount increased its per-share cash bid to $200.175 Time's manage-
ment responded to the increased offer with the same factors relied on to
reject the $175 offer. 17
6
168. Id.
169. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, at 14 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(LEXIS, States Library, Del.).
170. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1148 (Del. 1989). While Time
advisors established a range of value for Time between $189.88-212.25, and Paramount's second
offer of $200 fell within that range, another Time advisor thought that after the merger Time-
Warner would trade at around $150 per share. Time, No. 10866, at 15 [LEXIS]. Thus, the court
reasoned that most money managers would be tempted by the cash offered by Paramount now, Id. at
17, even though Time's advisors projected long-term trading ranges of $159-247 for 1991, $230-332
for 1992 and $208-402 for 1993. Id. at 16.
171. Id. at 17.
172. Id. at 18.
173. Time, 571 A.2d at 1148. See also Wall St. J., July 25, 1989, at 43, Al 1; Saporito, The Inside
Story of TIME WARNER, FORTUNE, Nov. 20, 1989, at 164. Time-Warner paid $451 million in
interest and financing fees and took a $40 million earnings loss for amortization of good will, con-
tributing to a loss for the third quarter of $176 million. Id. at 208. Moreover, the $200 a share Time
stockholders did not get, at 12% a year, will be worth $352 in five years, and $621 in ten years.
Recently, Time-Warner's stock was trading at $70 7/8 per share. Wall St. J., Sept. 26, 1990, at C5.
174. Time, No. 10866, at 18 [LEXIS]. See also Time, 571 A.2d at 1148 (the court stated that
"[n]ine billion dollars of the total purchase price would be allocated to the purchase of Warner's
goodwill").
175. Time, 571 A.2d at 1149.
176. Id.
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After Time rejected Paramount's new offer and elected to acquire
Warner with cash, as opposed to the original stock swap, Paramount and
various Time shareholders filed suit in Delaware to enjoin Time's pro-
posed acquisition of Warner. The court began part of its analysis by stat-
ing that it is not part of the court's function to determine the adequacy or
inadequacy of the Time-Warner deal for the shareholders.177 Time's
shareholders complained that not only did Warner's shareholders receive
a substantial premium (56%) and Time shareholders get little, but that
they were foreclosed from considering the premium from Paramount.
78
While the lower court focused its discussion on two questions: (1) should
the court recognize a distinction between managing for current max-
imization and managing for longer-term value creation, and (2) who
should make such choices-the board or the shareholders, 79 the
Supreme Court of Delaware sought to answer the following question:
"Did Time's board, having developed a strategic plan of global expansion
to be launched through a business combination with Warner, come under
a fiduciary duty to jettison its plan and put the corporation's future in the
hands of its shareholder?"
80
From the start, the court tipped the scales in favor of the directors
as the group best suited to understand the undervaluation of the com-
pany's stock by the stock market.' 8 ' The court concluded that, under
Delaware law, directors are under no obligation to maximize the immedi-
ate value of the corporation or its shares, except when the corporation is
in "Revlon Mode."' 8 2 The lower court held that, "Delaware law does
recognize that directors, when acting deliberately, in an informed way,
and in the good faith pursuit of corporate interests, may follow a course
designed to achieve long-term value even at the cost of immediate value
maximization." 8 3 The Delaware Supreme Court, while affirming Chan-
177. Id. at 1151.
178. Id. See also supra notes 161 and 170.
179. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, at 21 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(LEXIS, States Library, Del.). See Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 41, discussing the passivity
role managers should assume during takeover bids.
180. Paramount Communications v. Time Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1149-50 (Del. 1989).
181. See Time, 571 A.2d at 1150 n.12. See also Time, No. 10866, at 22 [LEXIS], discussing the
undervaluation of stock by the market, and showing two examples of companies that succeeded after
rejecting a takeover attempt.
182. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150. See also Ivanhoe Partners v. Newmont Mining Corp., 535 A.2d
1334 (Del. 1987); Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
The court noted that when a board enters into a "change in control" transaction, it enters "Revlon
Mode." Time, 571 A.2d at 1150. Furthermore, a subjective disinclination to sell the company does
not prevent the Revlon duty from arising when a "change in control" transaction is involved. See
Time, No. 10866, at 23 [LEXIS]. But cf. Reder, supra note 95 (a mere "change in control" attack
does not trigger Revlon mode).
183. Time, No. 10866, at 23 [LEXIS]. The court used charitable contributions as an example of
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cellor Allen's decision, thought that it was "unwise to place undue em-
phasis upon long-term versus short-term corporate strategy."' 8 4 Because
the court believed that the directors' duty to manage the business and
affairs of the corporation' 85 encompassed the "authority to set a corpo-
rate course of action, including time frame, designed to enhance corpo-
rate profitability."' 1 6 The court stated that the directors' duty to set a
corporate course could not be delegated to the shareholders.
187
The lower court also considered the shareholders' assertion that,
under the duty of loyalty, the directors were obliged to let the sharehold-
ers choose whether the company should be sold.' 88 This assertion had
two parts. First, because the directors initially decided to put the stock
deal merger to shareholder vote, they were committed to let the share-
holders vote on the merger; therefore, the taking away of the stockholder
voting right constituted a breach of the duty of loyalty. 8 9 Second,
the Unocal test and its progeny required directors, in some circumstances
(e.g., the redemption of a "Poison Pill"), to permit shareholders
to choose between two alternative, but functionally equivalent,
transactions. '90
The lower court responded by stating that the directors' refusal to
consider offers may comport with a valid exercise of business judg-
ment. ' 9 ' As support, the court cited the litany of factors that the Unocal
court concluded were valid reasons for rejecting a takeover offer.'
92
Moreover, the court held that the merger did not constitute a change in
control, thus triggering "Revlon Mode."' 93 That 62% of the Time-
Warner shares would be held by former Warner shareholders was con-
sidered irrelevant. 194 Furthermore, Chancellor Allen held that the origi-
a long-term policy not within the immediate value maximization interests of the company. Id. at 23
n. 15. However, charitable contributions neither cause $10 billion in debt assumption, nor do they
result in disgruntled shareholders, as a result of taking away the opportunity to vote on the merger
or choose between alternative deals-thus depriving shareholders of a premium. See also supra note
161 and accompanying text.
184. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
185. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
186. Time, 571 A.2d at 1150. According to the court, this duty renders the question of "long-
term" versus "short-term" values irrelevant. Id.
187. Id. at 1154.
188. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
189. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, at 24 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(LEXIS, States Library, Del.).
190. Id. See also supra notes 41 and 160 and accompanying text.
191. Time, No. 10866, at 26 [LEXIS].
192. See Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
193. Time, No. 10866, at 26 [LEXIS].
194. Id. The court reasoned that, under some circumstances, a stock for stock merger could
reflect a "change in control" transaction; however, where the shares of both companies were widely
held, control remained in the market. Id. This is problematic for two reasons. First, Warner owned
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nal merger agreement did not legally preclude or impede a later sale or
result in a change of control transaction.195
Chancellor Allen's finding that a "change of control" situation did
not occur was based on the fact that control of Time existed in the mar-
ket. 196 While the Delaware Supreme Court stated that this finding was
correct as a matter of law, it rejected the plaintiffs' Revlon claim on dif-
ferent grounds. The court's decision was based upon the lack of any
substantial evidence demonstrating the decision of Time's board to make
"the dissolution or break-up of the corporate entity inevitable .... ",197
According to the court, Revlon duties arise in two situations:
[1] [W]hen a corporation initiates an active bidding process seeking to
sell itself or to effect a business reorganization involving a clear break-
up of the company.
[2] [W]here, in response to a bidder's offer, a target abandons its long-
term strategy and seeks an alternative transaction involving the break-
up of the company.
198
Therefore, where the board is not abandoning the corporation's exist-
ence, but merely taking a defensive response to a hostile takeover, it is
not Revlon duties which arise, but Unocal duties.' 99
The Delaware Supreme Court agreed with Chancellor Allen that
Revlon duties do not arise merely because the transaction may "be con-
strued as putting a corporation either 'in play' or 'up for sale'. ' '200 More-
over, the court held that "[t]he adoption of structural safety devices
[such as Time's utilization of a lock-up agreement, no-shop clause, and
dry-up agreements] 201 alone does not trigger Revlon. ' 20 2 A board's
adoption of such safety devices, the court noted, were subject to a Unocal
analysis.
If the directors acted in a defensive manner and invoked the "pro-
portionality" test of Unocal, then under Unocal the directors were re-
quired to prove that any defensive steps taken by them were reasonable
62% of the new entity. This must amount to a large block of shares held by "one" shareholder;
therefore, the court's determination that this was irrelevant seems incorrect. Second, all companies
have ultimate control in the market if they are publicly held.
195. Id. at 27.
196. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1150 (Del. 1989).
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. at 1150-51.
200. Id. at 1151.
201. The dry-up agreements consisted of Time's payment to various banks for confidence letters
whereby the banks promised not to provide financing for any potential acquirors of Time. Id. at
1146.
202. Id. at 1151.
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in relation to the threat posed.203 First, the court noted that Para-
mount's offer was noncoercive. 204 The lower court stated that it was
"aware of no principle, statute or rule of corporation law that would hold
that once a board approves an agreement of merger, it loses power to
reconsider that action prior to a shareholder vote."'205 The Delaware
Supreme Court, however, stated that noncoercive all-cash, all-shares of-
fers can pose sufficient "threats" to the corporation which can warrant
defensive responses protected under Unocal.2° 6 Initially, the court noted
that any consideration by a court of long-term versus short-term goals
distorts the Unocal process-most notably, that the defensive measure
adopted by the board be reasonable in relation to the threat posed.
20 7
Next, the court listed several legitimate "threats" that Time directors
relied upon both in rejecting Paramount's offer and in reformulating the
Warner merger. 208 Lastly, because the court found that Time directors
had adequately informed themselves of any potential benefits from a Par-
amount takeover, the court held that "Time's board was under no obliga-
tion to negotiate with Paramount." 20 9
Because the original merger agreement with Warner occurred before
the takeover attempt by Paramount, the court was correct in stating that
that particular decision did not fall under the enhanced business judg-
ment rule required by Unocal. The Unocal standard applies to all defen-
sive actions taken after a hostile takeover attempt has emerged.
210
However, Time's substitution of the cash acquisition for the stock deal
was a defensive action taken after the Paramount takeover bid, and must
be analyzed under the Unocal "reasonable in relation to the threat
203. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
204. The court noted that "the Court of Chancery has suggested that an all-cash, all-shares offer,
falling within a range of values that a shareholder might reasonably prefer, cannot constitute a le-
gally recognized 'threat' to shareholder interests sufficient to withstand a Unocal analysis." Para-
mount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989). For a more detailed
discussion on coercive offers, non-coercive offers, and shareholder choice, see supra notes 80 and 161
and accompanying text.
205. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., No. 10866, at 29 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989)
(LEXIS, States Library, Del.). However, if a board can reconsider a merger agreement with Com-
pany X, then it should likewise have to consider alternative and more attractive offers made by
companies A-N. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
206. Time, 571 A.2d at 1153.
207. Id.
208. The court listed such "threats" as: (1) a concern that Time shareholders would accept
Paramount's cash offer because of mistaken belief or ignorance of the benefits of a Warner merger;
(2) that the conditions of Paramount's offer resulted in uncertainty; and (3) that Paramount's offer
was intentionally timed so as to confuse Time shareholders' vote. Id.
209. Id. at 1154.
210. Id. at 1150-51. See also AC Acquisitions Corp. v. Anderson, Clayton & Co., 519 A.2d 103,




The court held that because Time's long-term plan to establish a
global economy for its products-namely by benefiting from Warner's
outstanding video or film production capacity and talent, and its substan-
tial and effective international marketing relationship and organiza-
tion 212-was of unquestionably great importance to Time and was not
overly broad, it was a reasonable reaction in relation to the threat posed
to the Warner merger by the Paramount offer. 213 The court concluded
by stating that the financial vitality of the company and the value of its
shares are in the hands of the directors and managers, because it is the
duty of the directors, not shareholders, to manage the firm.2 1 4
B Analysis of Time
After the court decided Time, an even stronger argument exists that
directors have carte blanche to determine the vitality of the company.
However, the Time decision neglected one very important consideration:
that "even finely crafted deals may become unraveled at the eleventh
hour. ' 21 5 That consideration should act as a bar on directors' ability to
preclude shareholders from accepting a more attractive offer. 216
211. Paramount Communications v. Time, Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989).
212. Id. at 1144-45. See also supra notes 150 and 152 and accompanying text.
213. Time, 571 A.2d at 1155. However, because Paramount's offer was an any-and-all cash
noncoercive offer within the range of values Time's advisors stated, Time's reaction to alter its
merger plans with Warner and forego shareholder approval and assume substantial debt seems un-
reasonable. Furthermore, the court in Time stated "that even in light of a valid threat, management
actions that are coercive in nature or force upon shareholders a management-sponsored alternative
to a hostile offer may be struck down as unreasonable and non-proportionate responses." Time, 571
A.2d at 1154. For instance, in an attempt to prevent Paramount from obtaining the franchise trans-
fers, Time directors encouraged local franchisors to bring suit against Paramount. Id. at 1148 n.l 1.
See supra note 161 and accompanying text. For an example of a case factually similar to Time, see
Crouse-Hinds Co. v. Internorth, Inc., 634 F.2d 690 (2d Cir. 1980). In Crouse-Hinds, a merger agree-
ment between Crouse-Hinds and Belden preceded a takeover offer tendered by Internorth (same as
Time). The original one-step merger was modified to a two-step merger in response to the takeover
bid. Id. at 695. However, contrary to Time, Crouse-Hind's modification did not require the assump-
tion of substantial debt nor the removal of shareholder vote on the merger consummation.
214. Time, 571 A.2d at 1154. But, while the directors have the authority to make business
decisions and run the company, they are supposed to make those decisions in the shareholders' best
interests. See sources cited supra note 38. Moreover, directors are obligated to "abandon a deliber-
ately conceived corporate plan for a short-term shareholder profit [if] there is clearly no basis to
sustain the corporate strategy." Time, 571 A.2d at 1154.
215. Mesa Partners v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 488 A.2d 107, 116 (Del. Ch. 1984). One commen-
tator thought that a merger deal is "not over 'til the fat lady sings' . . . and the overriding goal of the
parties has now become to make it very difficult, or at least expensive, for anyone else to crash the
party." Freund, supra note 21, at 495.
216. Supra note 161 and accompanying text. Consistent with the view of allowing shareholders
to choose between alternative offers is the statement that "[a] prophylactic rule that would prevent
management from making profitable acquisitions would harm shareholders, [while] application of
the usual business judgment rule would give managers free rein to carry out disguised programs of
resistance." Easterbrook & Fischel, Proper Role, supra note 21, at 1202-03. This statement lends
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The Time shareholders' interests, as well as the interests of share-
holders similarly situated in the future, have been severely lessened by
the court's decision. The court's ruling gives directors, who are set on
consummating a "long-term" strategic plan, carte blanche to thwart any
takeover attempt "threatening" their speculative valuation of the long-
term "value" of the company--even contrary to the wishes of the share-
holders. 217 Even though the directors have been given the authority to
manage the business and affairs of the corporation, pursuant to the bed-
rock of Delaware's Corporate Law section 141(a), 218 they owe duties of
care and loyalty to the shareholders. 219 Therefore, while the directors do
run the company, they are supposed to run it for the shareholders' best
interests. Furthermore, even though the court stated that distinctions
between long-term and short-term plans are irrelevant, directors can now
use a long-term plan argument to demonstrate that their corporation's
existence is intact. Therefore, because the directors' war chest is filled
with endless defensive mechanisms, they should be able to justify any
board action short of a scorched earth tactic or an action consummated
through gross negligence.
While the Time directors did not act with the same degree of gross
negligence as did the directors in Van Gorkom, the Time directors' ac-
tions could be described as grossly overreaching, thus requiring the direc-
tors to prove the objective fairness of their decision. 220 The directors'
decision to remain "independent" could be likened to the directors' deci-
sion in Panter,221 where Judge Cudahy expressed his concern that "one
man's desire to 'build value' may be another man's desire to 'keep control
at all costs.' "222
Also problematic about the Time decision is the justification of the
"corporate culture" 223 defense. Given the ever increasing number of de-
support to the proposition that directors, under the current laws, have carte blanche to determine
the corporation's vitality. But cf. Texaco Inc. v. Pennzoil, 729 S.W.2d 768 (Tex.), cert. denied, 485
U.S. 994 (1987) (where the Texas Supreme Court held that there must be a point in time in which a
contract is final, and subsequent dealings are a breach of the original contract).
217. See Aprahamian v. HBO & Co., 531 A.2d 1204, 1208 (Del Ch. 1987) ("If the will of the
stockholders is thwarted . . . there may be considerable hardship to the stockholders and their
corporation").
218. Supra note 36 and accompanying text.
219. See sources cited supra note 38.
220. Supra note 33 and accompanying text.
221. Supra note 119 and accompanying text.
222. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 306 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
223. Supra note 152 and accompanying text. See also Saporito, supra note 148. Protecting a
corporate culture might be a valid reason for resisting a takeover. Id. at 56.
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fensive mechanisms available to directors, 224 the litany of factors Unocal
allows directors to consider, 225 and the legislative approval given direc-
tors under antitakeover statutes,226 the addition of the "corporate cul-
ture" defense presents another powerful defensive response to hostile, as
well as nonhostile (any-and-all cash offers) offers. Probably the most
damaging aspect of the "corporate culture" defense is its lack of defini-
tion. The lack of definable boundaries for "corporate culture" may cause
directors to amend by-laws or articles of incorporation, or make acquisi-
tions or sales to give its company a "corporate culture" appearance.
Then, when a bidder, either hostile or nonhostile, makes a bid for the
company, the board can "Just Say No, ' 227 asserting that a takeover
would upset its "corporate culture."
Another problem with Time, relating back to Unocal, is the ability
of directors to consider the effects of the takeover on "other constituen-
cies."' 228 Even though Revlon seemed to curtail the extent to which di-
rectors can consider "other constituencies, ' 229 directors still can
effectuate or thwart a takeover based primarily on considerations of
"other constituencies" which at least present minimal "rationally related
benefits" to shareholders. 230 This scenario was exemplified perfectly in
Time, where the merger helped Time set up its global economy, but the
merger cost Time $10 billion and lessened the shareholders' respect for
its board (since Time denied them Paramount's premium offer, or in the
alternative, the opportunity to vote on the Warner merger).
The last problem associated with Time concerns the "threat" posed
by Paramount's offer and Time's reaction to that "threat." Given the
noncoercive 23 t nature of the offer presented by Paramount, which fell
within the range of values for Time232-as established by Time's advi-
sors-the directors' response was not reasonable. The assumption of $10
billion in debt to merge with a company that as one entity would have a
224. Supra note 28 and accompanying text. See also Taub, LBO's" The Next Lap, FIN. WORLD,
Oct. 31, 1989, at 24-25, stating that the new era of less-leveraged buyouts (more equity based
buyouts) are picking up where leveraged buyouts left off. LLBO's mean lower returns for LBO
partners and lower prices for takeover targets. Therefore, more equity deals will mean less debt.
225. Supra note 99 and accompanying text.
226. See statutes cited supra note 124.
227. Supra note 119 and accompanying text. See also Paramount Communications v. Time,
Inc., 571 A.2d 1140, 1152 (Del. 1989) (the court stated that refusing "to entertain an offer may
comport with a valid exercise of a board's business judgment").
228. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
229. See supra note 30 and accompanying text.
230. But see Gilson & Kraakman, supra note 21, at 259 n.41, where the authors state that Revlon
would preclude this scenario from occurring.
231. Supra note 161 and accompanying text.
232. Supra note 170 and accompanying text.
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lower per share value then the takeover offer presented 233 and the reneg-
ing of shareholder voting rights concerning that merger were not reason-
able. The directors' response to the Paramount takeover is tantamount
to the "scorched earth" tactic attempted in Joseph E. Seagram & Sons.
234
Just as the decision to destroy the company in Seagram was not within
the ambit of the business judgment rule, neither should Time's decision
to "destroy" its company fall within the rule's protective reach. The ap-
parent effect of Time is that directors may now be able to protect every
business decision from either shareholder or judicial scrutiny. The pre-
ferred standard would require directors to submit merger or acquisition
proposals for a majority vote of both shareholders and disinterested
shareholders, as required of takeover companies in some antitakeover
statutes.
VI. CONCLUSION
The business judgment rule's emphasis on an informed decision by
the directors made in the best interests of the shareholders does not al-
ways protect shareholders. While all corporate decisions should be in-
formed, the protection of shareholder investments should be a
paramount consideration. When an opportunity arises that maximizes
shareholders' interests (i.e., investments), directors owe a duty of care
and loyalty to consider that opportunity with a "critical eye."'235 How-
ever, until courts decide to place constraints upon directors' authority,
shareholders "are on their own and [should] expect little consideration
and less enlightenment from their board of directors" 236 and from the
courts.
233. Id.
234. Supra note 24 and accompanying text.
235. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
236. Panter v. Marshall Field & Co., 646 F.2d 271, 312 (7th Cir.) (Cudahy, J., dissenting), cert.
denied, 454 U.S. 1092 (1981).
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